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Abstract
This paper is the first attempt to rigorously evaluate the short term effects of the ‘Janani Suraksha
Yojna’ (Safe Motherhood Scheme), a nationwide conditional cash transfer program in India, launched
in April 2005. Under the scheme, a woman delivering her child in a medical facility is provided
monetary rewards. My difference-in-difference results indicate that in the initial one and a half years
of its operation, the scheme did not have any effect on the disparity between the targeted and non-
targeted states. In fact, the gap widened in this period, albeit marginally. But beginning from 2007,
the targeted states have shown much larger improvements in the institutional deliveries, leading to a
dramatic decline in the gap between the targeted and the non-targeted states. I also show that the
convergence or differential improvement in access and availability of medical facilities are not driving
my results.
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1 Introduction
Each year, more than half a million women die from causes related to pregnancy and child-birth (UNICEF
(2008)). Further, for every woman who dies from pregnancy-related complications, around 20 more incur
injuries, infections and disabilities. The average lifetime risk of a woman in a least developed country
dying from pregnancy or child-birth related complications is estimated to be 300 times greater than for
a woman living in an industrialized country. The figures for 2005 suggest that more than 99 per cent of
overall maternal deaths took place in developing countries. Half of these (around 265,000) took place in
Sub-Saharan Africa and another third (187,000) in South Asia. India alone had 22 per cent of the global
total.
Most maternal deaths are related to obstetric complications- including post-partum haemorrhage,
infections, eclampsia and prolonged or obstructed labor. Most of these direct causes of maternal mortality
can be readily addressed if skilled health personnel are on hand and key drugs, equipment and referral
facilities are available.
The picture is not too different for neo-natal mortality, i.e. probability of a newborn dying between
birth and the first 28 completed days of life. The World Health Organization’s figures in 2004 suggest
that almost 40 per cent of under-5 deaths, around 3.7 millions, occur in the first 28 days of life. 98 per
cent of neo-natal deaths occur in low and middle- income countries. In terms of regions, Western and
Central Africa has the highest neo-natal mortality rate, 45 per thousand live births, followed by South
Asia, 41 per thousand live births, and Eastern and Southern Africa, 36 per thousand live births.
Some 86 per cent of the newborn deaths are the direct results of the three main causes- severe
infections, asphyxia and preterm births. Infections include sepsis/ pneumonia, tetanus and diarrhea.
Clean delivery practices, improved care during labor and delivery, presence of skilled health worker who
can detect early signs of danger are important in preventing newborn deaths.
The above discussion suggests that delivering a baby in a medical facility, under the supervision of
a skilled medical professional can surely make a significant dent in the instances of maternal and neo-
natal mortality. This paper evaluates an important scheme in India, whose main objective is to reduce
maternal and infant mortality. The scheme tries to achieve this by providing monetary incentives to
women to deliver babies in medical faciliites. It is targeted towards the poorer sections of the society
and the regions where the proportion of women delivering in health facilities is abysmally low.
2 Situation in India
Though India has made rapid economic progress in last few years, the human development indicators
have not shown similar progress. There has been a steady reduction in the maternal mortality ratio
(henceforth, MMR), as seen in Table 11. From a high level of 398 in 1997- 98, it has come down to
254 per 100,000 live births for India as a whole, as per the 2004- 06 RGI-SRS (Registrar General of
India- Sample Registration System). The figure is still high compared to the other developing countries.
Countries such as China, Philippines, Thailand, Sri Lanka have MMR less than 100(UNICEF (2008)).
The table also shows wide disparity among the states. Among the major states, only 8 states have been
able to bring the MMR below 200 and only one state (Kerala) has been able to bring the MMR below
100 per 100 thousand live births. For other states, the MMR levels are still unacceptably high. About
two- thirds of maternal deaths are concentrated in a handful of states- Bihar and Jharkhand, Orissa,
1Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) is derived as the proportion of maternal deaths per 100,000 live births Sample
Registration System, Office of Registrar General, India (2009)
2
Madhya Pradesh and Chattisgarh, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Uttarakhand, and in Assam.
The states with a high MMR also have a relatively higher fraction of child- deliveries taking place
without any help of skilled health professional as indicated in the same table.
It was on this backdrop that the ‘National Rural Health Mission’ (henceforth, NRHM) was launched
in April 2005. One of the major objectives of the NRHM has been to reduce the maternal mortality to
100 per 100 thousand and reduce infant mortality to 30 per thousand live births by the year 2012. For
details about the goals of the NRHM, approach, administration, funding pattern, please see (Ministry
of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India (2009)).
The most ambitious initiative to achieve this objective is the ‘Janani Suraksha Yojna’ (henceforth
JSY) i.e. Safe Motherhood Scheme, launched in April 2005.
3 Janani Suraksha Yojna (JSY)
The main objective of the JSY is to reduce maternal and neo-natal mortality. It tries to achieve this
by promoting institutional delivery, making available quality maternal care during pregnancy, delivery
and in the immediate post-delivery period along with appropriate referral and transport assistance. The
scheme is sponsored fully by the Central government.
The JSY is a conditional cash transfer scheme- a woman is paid money if she delivers her baby in a
medical facility- in government health centres, like subcenters (SCs), Primary Health Centers (PHCs),
Community Health Centers (CHCs) or general wards of district or state hospitals, government medical
colleges or accredited private institutions2.
The NRHM has divided the states into two categories- the Low Performing (or targeted) States
(LPS) and the High Performing (non-targeted) States (HPS), depending upon the pre-program level
of institutional deliveries. The targeted states are the ones where the proportion of the institutional
deliveries is very low.
The initial set of eligibility rules, uniform across the whole country, was issued in April 2005. Ac-
cording to these rules, only those women who were of 19 years of age and above, and belonged to the
below poverty line (henceforth, BPL) families, were eligible for the benefit under the JSY. The benefit
was restricted to the first two live births. In the targeted states, women were eligible for benefit for third
birth as well, provided the beneficiary opts for sterilization immediately after delivery. The monetary
incentives are described in table 2.
These eligibility rules were deemed to be too strict, especially in the targeted states, and hence, new
guidelines were issued in late 20063. According to these guidelines, in the targeted states-
1) All pregnant women, irresptive of age, poverty status and number of births, are eligibile for benefit
under the JSY if they deliver in a government medical facility.
2) The women from the BPL households and all the women (irrespective of poverty status) from the
Scheduled Castes (SC) /Scheduled Tribes (ST) households are eligible for the benefit under the JSY if
they deliver in an accredited private medical facility4.
In case of the non-targeted states-
1) Only those pregnant women who are aged 19 years and above, and belong to the BPL households,
2The conditional cash transfer programs have become quite popular in the developing countries in the last decade. For
an in-depth discussion about the nature, type, objectives and effect of various such programs, see Fiszbein et al. (2009).
3The exact month needs to be confirmed.
4It should be noted that the woman delivering in a private medical facility is not reimbursed the entire cost. She is only
given the fixed amount as mentioned in the scheme.
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are eligible for cash assistance.
2) In case of the Scheduled Castes (SC) or Scheduled Tribes (ST) households, all women irrespective
of their poverty status, are eligible for cash assistance, provided they are above the age of 19. Cash
assistance is limited to only two live births, even for the women belonging to the Scheduled Castes (SC)
and Scheduled Tribes (ST).
In brief, any pregnant woman in a targeted state is eligible for the benefit under the JSY, while age,
poverty status and number of births still matter in the targeted states.
In addition to the eligibility rules, the amount of financial assistance was modified. The beneficiaries
in the targeted states are now given Rs. 1400 if the woman lives in rural area, and Rs. 1000 if the woman
lives in urban area5. For the beneficiaries in the non-targeted states, the corresponding amounts are Rs.
700 and Rs. 6006. Table 3 shows the scale of cash assistance in the targeted and non-targeted states.
Table 4 shows year-wise number of beneficiaries in the targeted and the non-targeted states. The
table shows that in the inital period, the number of beneficiaries were high in the non-targeted states.
But in the later periods, the numbers have increased massively for the targeted states. As on March 31,
2010, the number of beneficiaries in the year 2009-10 stood at 92.29 lakhs (i.e. 9.3 million). These huge
numbers make the JSY one of the largest conditional cash transfer programs in the world7.
3.1 Disbursement of Cash Incentive to the Mothers
According to the guidelines, the financial assistance to the mother should be disbursed at the medical
facility itself, in one instalment before her discharge from the medical facility. The amount would be
paid only to the mother and not to any other person. The disbursement should be done either by an
Auxiliary Nurse Midwife (ANM) or ASHA8. In the places that don’t yet have an ASHA, any other link
worker such as Anganwadi worker can carry out the disbursement. If a woman goes to her mother’s place
for delivery or to a district / state hospital, the amount of assistance would be based on the place of
residency. The expectant mothers are supposed to carry a referal slip from ANM, which would indicate
their place of residency.
In order to receive benefits, ‘Below Poverty Line’ (BPL) certificate or caste Certificate (for SC / ST
mothers) are required (wherever applicable). If the BPL certification is not available through a legally
constituted process, the beneficiary can still avail the benefit on certification by the local council (such
as village council), elected representatives, revenue authorities, provided the delivery takes place in a
government institution. But the benefit available under the JSY, when a BPL woman delivers in an
accredited private hospital, can be obtained only by producing a regular BPL card whose number etc.
has to be quoted in the discharge card issued by the private institution9.
5$31.11 and $22.22 using Rs. 45/$ as exchange rate
6$15.55 and $13.33
7Brazil’s Bolsa Familia benefits around 11 million families or 46 million individuals, covering quarter of the Brazil’s
population and is the world’s largest. The next, Mexico’s Oportunidades(formerly known as Progresa) reaches to 5 million
households. Both of these are braod anti-poverty programs and provide cash transfers to the households if the households
fulfil requirements regarding children’s education, vaccination and nutrition. The JSY on the other hand is much narrower.
8The ANM is a key functionary in rural health system. Her main responsibilities include antenatal care, conducting
deliveries etc. Over time, other functions, such as family planning, immunization, sanitation, infectious disease prevention
etc. were added. ASHA stands for Accredited Social Health Activist, a new category of health workers introduced under
the NRHM.
9The SC / ST women don’t need to show BPL certificate but only the caste certificate.
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4 Empirical Strategy
The discussion so far reveals that the JSY was introduced throughout the entire country at the same
time. Much less stringent eligibility criteria and higher (almost double) monetary assistance suggest that
the scheme should have a higher impact in the targeted states. Hence, we hypothesize that, other things
being equal, the targeted states should witness a larger increase in the institutional deliveries as compared
to the non-targeted states. Thus, our empirical strategy compares the changes in the proportion of the
institutional deliveries between the targeted and the non-targeted states.
We consider the following regression specification,
Yit = β0 + β1.(LPSi) + β2.(POSTt) + β3.(LPSi ∗ POSTt) + β.(OtherControlsi) + it, (1)
where the dependent variable Yit is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the woman has delivered
the child in a medical facility, zero otherwise. The baseline is the pre-program level of institutional
delivery in the non-targeted states. ‘LPS’ is a dummy variables indicating if the woman is resident of
a targeted (low performing) state. It captures the pre-existing differences between the targeted and the
non-targeted states. We expect it’s coefficient to be negative. ‘POST’ equals 1 for births that took
place after the launch of the program, i.e. after April 2005. It captures the change in the institutional
deliveries in the non-targeted states relative to the baseline. The interaction term ‘LPS*POST’ captures
change in the institutional deliveries in the targeted states relative to the changes in the non-targeted
states10.
4.1 Measuring Annual Effects
In addition to the average effects of the JSY, we also estimate the annual effects. It might take some
time for the implmentation guidelines to be framed by the concerned departments in the the central and
the state governments, for information about the scheme to reach to people. Hence one can expect some
delays in the effective implmentation of the scheme. Further, given the differences in the targeted and
the non-targeted states, one can also expect that the extent of delays might differ between these two
groups of states. Estimating annual effects will give us some idea of such potential delays.
We consider the following regression specification,
Yit = β0 + β1.(LPSi) + β2.(Y 2005t) + β3.(Y 2006t) + β4.(Y 2007t) + β5.(Y 2008t)
+ β6.(LPSi ∗ Y 2005t) + β7.(LPSi ∗ Y 2006t) + β8.(LPSi ∗ Y 2007t) + β9.(LPSi ∗ Y 2008t)
+ β.(OtherControlsi) + it, (2)
‘Y2005’ to ‘Y2008’ are dummy variables for the births that have taken place in 2005 (after the launch
of the JSY), 2006, 2007 and 2008 respectively. They capture increase in the institutional deliveries in
the non-targeted states relative to the pre-program level. We expect the coefficients on these variables to
be positive. The coefficients on the interaction terms indicate the differential change in the institutional
deliveries in the targeted states relative to the changes in the non-targeted states in that particular year,
relative to the baseline. If the institutional deliveries have increased more in the targeted states relative
to the non-targeted states, these coefficients would be positive. If the scheme has started to have an
10(Change in LPS)-(Change in HPS)
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effect after a lag, then the coefficients on the interaction terms involving later years would be higher
compared to the ones which involve beginning years.
4.2 Pre-Treatment Trends in the Targeted and Non-Targeted States
Even if we find that there is differential increase in the institutional deliveries in the targeted states
after the launch of the JSY, it may or may not be attributed to the JSY. The possibility of convergence
suggests that even in the absence of the program, the targeted states might have experienced faster
increase in institutional deliveries, because the level of institutional deliveries was quite low in these
states before the launch of the program. In order to alleviate this concern, we look at the trends in the
institutional deliveries before the launch of the JSY, in the targeted and the non-targeted states. If the
trends are indeed the same, then the differential trends after the launch of the program can be attributed
to the program.
To check whether the trends were similar, we consider the following regression specification, where
1995 is the omitted year (baseline):
Yit = β0 + β1.(LPSi) + β2.(Y 1996t) + β3.(Y 1997t) + β4.(Y 1998t) + β5(Y 1999t)
+ β6.(Y 2000t) + β7.(Y 2001t) + β8.(Y 2002t) + β9(Y 2003t) + β10(Y 2004t)
+ β11.(LPSi ∗ Y 1996t) + β12.(LPSi ∗ Y 1997t) + β13.(LPSi ∗ Y 1998t)
+ β13.(LPSi ∗ Y 1999t) + β14.(LPSi ∗ Y 2000t) + β15.(LPSi ∗ Y 2001t)
+ β16.(LPSi ∗ Y 2002t) + β17.(LPSi ∗ Y 2003t) + β.(LPSi ∗ Y 2004t)
+ β.(OtherControlsi) + it, (3)
In the above specification, we use data from the surveys conducted before the JSY was launched. We
would expect that the coefficients on the interaction terms would be zero if the trends in the institutional
deliveries were similar in the targeted and the non-targeted states.
5 Data
Our empirical analysis uses 1998-99, 2002-04 and 2007-08 waves of the Reproductive and Child Health-
District Level Health Survey (henceforth, RCH- DLHS). These nationwide surveys are conducted on
behalf of the Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, Government of India and the International Institute
of Population Sciences (I.I.P.S.), Mumbai is the nodal agency11.
There are separate questionnaires to obtain relevant information about the households, men, women
and the surveyed villages (please see Table 4). The focus of the woman’s questionnaire is to obtain infor-
mation about maternal and child health care- antenatal care, place of delivery of the child, breastfeeding,
immunization, prevalence and awareness about diarrhea, family planning and use of contraceptives, and
awareness about sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS. The household questionnaire obtains
information about the household such as size of the household, religion, caste, age and education of
family members, marriages, deaths and births in the family, water and sanitation facilities, consumer
durables and other assets. The village questionnaire obtains information about health, schooling and
other facilities in the village12.
11http://www.rchiips.org/
12The questionnaires are not uniform across the three rounds. The later rounds collect more information. For example,
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5.1 Sample
We combine all the three rounds to create a pooled sample. We drop the North-Eastern states and the
Union Territories13. Thus our final sample include the states of Jammu & Kashmir, Himachal Pradesh,
Uttaranchal, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Orissa, Jharkhand, Madhya Pradesh, Chattisgarh and Rajasthan,
classified as the ‘Low Performing States’ (targeted states), and Delhi, Punjab, Haryana, West Bengal,
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Goa, Karnataka, Kerala, Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu, classified as the ‘High
Performing States’ (map of India (figure 1)).
In all the three rounds, the married women in the age group of 15 to 44 years are asked information
about their pregnancies. If the woman respondent has given birth to a child within a period of 3-4 years
before the survey, she is also asked detailed information about the receipt of antenatal care, problems
during pregnancy, receipt of iron folic acid tablets/ syrup, tetanus injections, place of delivery and role of
health workers, pertaining to such birth14. If the woman has given birth to more than one child within
this time period, these questions pertain to the last pregnancy. Table 5 shows yearwise number of such
births in our pooled data. Finally, we exclude those women (and households) who have not given birth
to a child in the prescribed time period.
We define a delivery as ‘institutional delivery’ if this delivery has taken place in any medical facility,
whether owned by public or private sector or by NGO/ charitable trusts15.
6 Results
Table 7 presents the average treatment effects. We use DLHS 2 (2002-04) and DLHS 3 (2007-08) rounds,
which give us a sample of women who have given birth in the years 1999 to 2008. ‘POST’ equals 0 for
the births that took place between January 1, 1999 to April 2005, and 1 thereafter. We present the
results for the all India sample in colummns 1a and 2a, for the rural sample in columns 1b and 2b, and
for the urban sample in columns 1c and 2c. Column 1 always presents the results without any controls
other than the variables displayed, while column 2 presents results with additional controls.
The coeffcient estimates on the interaction term ‘LPS*POST’ in columns 2a and 2b indicate that
there has been no differential increase in the institutional deliveries in the low performing state in the
post-program period. Only the urban areas of the targeted states show some positive impact with the
institutional deliveries increasing by 3 percentage points relative to the non-targeted states, as shown in
column 2c. But given the huge gap between the two groups and the low levels in the targeted states in
the pre-program period, this increase can’t be treated as practically significant.
Now, we analyze the annual treatment effects. In the figures 1, 2 and 3, we present the evolution of
the gap in the institutional deliveries between the targeted and the non-targeted states- for the entire
sample (figure 1), for the rural sample (figure 2), and for the urban sample (figure 3)16. We have also
in DLHS 1, there is no separate village questionnaire. The Household questionnaire asks very few questions about the
possession of assets compared to the later rounds
13The North-Eastern states are Assam, Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Mizoram, Tripura and Meghalaya. The
Union Territories include Lakshadweep, Andaman & Nikobar Islands, Pondicherry, Daman & Diu, Dadra & Nagar Haveli
and Chandigarh.
14For DLHS 3, time period is from January 1, 2004 to the date of survey. For DLHS 2, time period is from January 1,
1999 to the date of survey for phase 1, and from January 1, 2002 to the date of survey for phase 2. For DLHS 1, time
period is from January 1, 1995 to the date of survey for phase 1, and from January 1, 1996 to the date of survey for phase
2
15The public / government medical facilities include sub centers, primary health centers, community health centers, rural
hospitals, district hospitals, AYUSH hospitals or clinics, government dispensarie or clinics, municipal/ state hospitals etc.
16The figures are based on the regression of the dummy variable for the institutional delivery on the year dummies
from 1996 to 2008, a dummy for the targeted state, the interactions between each of the year dummies and the dummy
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shown the 95% confidence intervals. All the figures indicate existence of a huge gap between the targeted
and the non-targeted states at the beginning of the sample, i.e. 1995 (around 14% for the entire sample,
12.5% for the rural sample, and slightly above 15% for the urban sample). The gap seemed to have
increased for the entire sample and for the rural sample upto the year 2004. For the urban sample, the
gap has shown some fluctuations. It’s level in 2004 is marginally higher than the level in 1995. After
2005, the gap seems to have widened. But it declines rapidly in the years 2007 and 2008.
Table 8, based on specification 2, quantifies these trends. The negative and significant coefficient
estimates on ‘LPS*2005’ and ‘LPS*2006’ in the all India sample (column 2a)and the rural sample (column
2b) indicate that the increase in the institutional deliveries was greater in the non-targeted states, i.e.
the gap widened marginally in 2005 and 200617. For the urban sample, the corresponding estimates are
zero, implying no change in the gap between the two groups of states. Hence, it seems that in the initital
year and a half of the operation of the JSY, the scheme did not have the desired impact18. But the
signs of the coefficient estimates change for the interaction terms ‘LPS*2007’ and ‘LPS*2008’. They are
positive, significant and large in magnitude in all the specifications. This suggests that the gap between
the two groups is declining. For example, the estimates of ‘LPS*2007’ and ‘LPS*2008’ in column 2a
(all India sample) imply that the increase in the proportion of the institutional deliveries was higher
in the targeted states by 3.7 and 6.9 percentage points respectively, relative to the non-targeted states.
The similar pattern also hold for the rural and the urban sample. In fact, the extent of increase in the
institutional deliveries is much higher in the urban areas compared to the rural areas of the targeted
states.
The key question is: Can these trends be attributed to the JSY? This question can be answered by
analyzing the pre-treatment trends in the institutional deliveries in the targeted and the non-targeted
states. We use DLHS rounds 1 (1998-99) and 2 (2002-04), which give us a sample of women who have
given birth in the years 1995 to 2004. Thus, all the births in these two rounds have occurred before the
JSY was launched. We use this sample to estimate the specification 3. As mentioned earlier, we are
interested in the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients on the interaction terms. If these estimates
are zero then it implies that the trends in the targeted and the non-targeted states were similar in the
pre-treatment period. The results are presented in the figure 4, and in table 9, with year 1995 as the
base period. Note that we only present the coefficients corresponding to the interaction terms in table
91920.
In the figure, it can be easily seen that for the all India sample, the trends are almost identical upto
the year 1999. In 2000, the low performing states lag behind. But from 2000 onwards, the trends are
almost parallel, except for 2004, where the trends diverge. The coefficients in table 9 tell the same story.
Except for the coefficients on ‘LPS*2000’ and ‘LPS*2004’, none of the coefficients are significant, even
at the 10% level, suggesting that the trends are broadly similar. Similar patttern holds for the rural
sample as well (column 2b). But here the coefficients estimates are larger and significant as well. On the
other hand, for the urban sample, the low performing states seem to be doing better in some years and
in some years, the trend is similar (column 2c).
for the targeted state, and other individual and household level controls. The baseline is the year 1995. The addition
of the coefficient on the targeted states and the coefficients on the interaction terms give us the gap in the proportion of
institutional delivery between the targeted and the non-targeted states.
17The baseline is the proportion of institutional deliveries in the period 1999- 2004.
18The program was launched in April 2005.
19In the figure, the coefficients for the non-targeted states are obtained as coefficients on the year dummies, while the
coefficients on the low performing states are obtained as the sum of the coefficients on year dummies and corresponding
interaction dummies.
20Complete results are available with the author upon request.
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Thus, we can not assert that the trends in the institutional deliveries are exactly identical in the
pre-treatment period. But these results clearly indicate that our annual treatment effects, especially
for the all India sample and the rural sample, are very unlikely to be driven by convergence, which is
reassuring.
7 Availability and Access to Medical Facilities
Another possibility is that the availability and the access to the medical facilities might have changed
over the period under consideration. The NRHM is very broad scheme, which has within its ambit,
various dimensions of the health care system, such as building new health care facilities, improving the
existing ones etc. Given the preferential treatment for the low performing states, it might be possible
that the low performing states experience differential trends.
We have village level data from the two separate rounds of the DLHS, DLHS II (2002-04) and DLHS
III (2007-08)21. The village questionnaire in both the surveys seeks information about the availability
and the access to various medical facilities. We run a simple difference-in-difference regression, where
the dependent variables are- 1) whether the village has a particular medical facility (child development
centre (Anganwadi), subcentre, primary health centre, Government dispensary, AYUSH clinic and fi-
nally, mobile health clinic.), and 2) whether the village has access to a particular medical facility (child
development centre, subcentre, primary health centre, community hospital, district hospital and finally,
private hospital.). The results are presented tables 10 and 1122.
The variable of interest is the interaction term ‘LPS * POST’, which captures differential trends
in the dependent variable in the low performing states. The results indicate that except for the child
development centre (anganwadi), there has been no differential change in the availability and the access
of any other medical facility. This suggests that the differential increase in the proportion of institutional
deliveries is unlikely to be driven by increased availability and access of medical facilities.
8 Possible Explanation of the Results
So far, we have shown that after the launch of the JSY, the gap between the low and the high performing
states widened to a small extent. But after the initial one and a half years, the trend reversed with the low
performing states showing much higher increase in the institutional deliveries than the high performing
states, which is the key objective of this scheme. What can be explanation for this?
The JSY was initiated throughout the entire country at the same time- in April 2005. Further, the
scale of financial assistance and eligibility criteria were identical in the rural areas for the states in both
the groups. Given the pre-existing differences in the low and the high performing states- in terms of
existence of public health facilities, their reach in the rural areas, one can argue that the women in the
high performing states were in a better position to utilize the scheme, which might explain increasing gap
in the initial year of the JSY. But major changes took place in the scale of assistance and the eligibility
criteria in the later half of 2006, as discussed previously in the paper. These changes made almost every
women eligible in the low performing states, along with the enhanced level of financial assistance in the
rural areas. Given the time lag involved in information reaching to the grassroot level, it is reasonable
to expect that the effect of these changes would start showing up from 2007 onwards.
21The village data is not available for the DLHS I, 1998-99.
22The village survey is conducted only for the rural areas, hence the results are applicable only for the rural sample.
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9 Conclusion
This paper is a first attempt to rigorously evaluate the ‘Janani Suraksha Yojna’, an ambitious scheme
launched by the Government of India to reduce maternal and neo-natal mortality. The scheme pays
monetary rewards to the women who deliver their child in medical facilities. The eligibility rules and
the scale of rewards are designed to target those sections of the population and regions of the country,
which have very low levels of institutional delivery. There have been some qualitative studies which have
looked at the specific states in the post-program period (Center for Operations Research & Training
(CORT), UNFPA (2009), ILO Subregional Office, South Asia, New Delhi (2008). But to our knowledge,
no attempt has been made to provide cleaner estimates of the short term effects of the scheme.
We combine the pre-porgram and the post-program survey data and compare the increase in insti-
tutional deliveries between the low and the high performing states. We show that the scheme led to a
marginal increase in the gap between the two groups in the initial period. But in the later period, the gap
has started declining with the low performing states witnessing much larger increase in the institutional
deliveries, as compared to the high performing states. We analyze the pre-treatment trends and show
that convergence can not be an explanation for our results. Further, we also show that there has not
been any differential change in the availability and the access to the medical facilities in the targeted
states after the scheme was launched, with the exception of the ICDS. This increases our confidence that
the monetary incentives seem to be having an effect on the institutional deliveries.
The scheme has been in operation only for 5 years and the sample covers only the first three of these
years. Hence, the paper captures only the short-run impact of the scheme. These short-term results
indicate that the JSY is indeed making a difference.
Even though the JSY seems to have a positive impact on the institutional deliveries, its impact
on maternal and neo-natal mortality, the variables of interest, remains to be analyzed. The NRHM
has introduced a new category of health workers, ASHA (Accredited Social Health Activist), who are
supposed to play a very important role in promoting not just institutional deliveries but also antenatal
care, immunization etc. This scheme was initially introduced in the low performing states, and later
extended to the high performing states. The impact of ASHA also needs to be analyzed carefully23.
23The ASHAs are to be appointed in the rural areas, in the villages with the population of at least 1000. Hence, the the
results from the urban sample won’t be affected.
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Table 1: Institutional Deliveries and Maternal Mortality Ratio in Major States of India
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Institutional Institutional MMR MMR
Delivery Delivery
1998-99 2002-04 2001-03 2004-06
India 34 40.5 301 254
Low Performing States
Assam 23.8 26.8 490 480
Bihar 14.9 23 371 312
Madhya Pradesh 21.5 28.2 379 335
Orissa 23.4 34.4 358 303
Rajasthan 22.5 31.4 445 388
Uttar Pradesh 16.2 22.4 517 440
High Performing States
Andhra Pradesh 50.6 60.9 195 154
Gujarat 46.1 52.2 172 160
Haryana 25.7 35.1 162 186
Karnataka 50 58 228 213
Kerala 97 97.8 110 95
Maharashtra 57.1 57.9 149 130
Punjab 40.5 48.9 178 192
Tamil Nadu 78.8 86.1 134 111
West Bengal 38.9 46.3 194 141
Institutional deliveries are from the District Level Household Survey, 1998-99 & 2002-04.
The Maternal Mortality Ratios are from the publications of the Sample Registration System,
the Registrar General of India.
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Table 2: Original Monetary Incentives under the JSY
(1) (2)
Rural Urban
Low Performing State Rs. 700 Rs. 600
High Performing State Rs. 700 NIL
Rs. 700 = $15.55, Rs. 600 = $13.33 using Rs. 45/$ exchange rate
Eligibility-1)women above 19 years of age, 2) upto two live births, 3) BPL
Table 3: Modified Monetary Incentives under the JSY
(1) (2)
Rural Urban
Low Performing State Rs. 1400 Rs. 1000
High Performing State Rs. 700 Rs. 600
Rs. 700 = $15.55, Rs. 600 = $13.33 using Rs. 45/$ exchange rate
Rs. 1400 = $31.11, Rs. 1000 = $22.22 using Rs. 45/$ exchange rate
LPS = No restriction regarding age, poverty status, number of births
HPS = 1)women above 19 years of age, 2) upto two live births. 3) BPL
13
Table 4: The Number of JSY Beneficiaries
States 2005-06 2006-07 2007-08 2008-09 2009-10
High Focus States
Bihar 0.00 1.14 8.38 11.47 12.46
Chattisgarh 0.25 0.75 1.76 1.41 1.52
Himachal Pradesh 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.13 0.16
Jammu & Kashmir 0.02 0.13 0.11 0.08 0.92
Jharkhand 0.00 1.23 2.52 6.19 6.55
Madhya Pradesh 1.00 4.00 11.00 11.38 10.99
Orissa 0.26 2.27 4.90 3.09 5.36
Rajasthan 0.05 3.88 7.75 9.17 9.78
Uttar Pradesh 0.12 1.69 8.64 15.64 20.22
Uttarakhand 0.02 0.21 0.59 0.71 0.74
Total 1.74 15.36 45.75 59.27 68.70
Non High Focus States
Andhra Pradesh 0.00 0.00 4.35 4.50 2.41
Goa 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01
Gujarat 0.42 1.21 1.86 2.13 3.50
Haryana 0.03 0.23 0.57 0.48 0.68
Karnataka 0.38 2.33 2.83 3.31 3.34
Kerala 0.20 0.59 1.48 1.36 0.94
Maharashtra 2.00 1.81 2.19 2.24 3.17
Punjab 0.78 0.17 0.29 0.68 0.97
Tamil Nadu 0.87 2.88 2.30 3.87 3.89
West Bengal 0.31 2.25 5.73 3.17
Total 5.00 11.47 21.60 21.74 18.91
All India 7.04 29.31 71.19 85.42 92.29
The High Focus States in the table excludes the states in the North-East India.
The Non High Focus States in the table excludes the Union Territories.
The All India total is greater than the sum of the High Focus and the Non High
Focus states due to the above-mentioned exclusions.
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Table 5: District Level Household Surveys
(1) (2)
Year Questionnaires
DLHS 1 May- November 1998 (Phase 1) Household, Currently Married Women (age 15- 44 years)
October 1999 (Phase 2)
DLHS 2 March- December 2002 (Phase 1) Household, Currently Married Women (age 15- 44 years),
January- October 2004 (Phase 2) Husband, Village
DLHS 3 November 2007- May 2008 Household, Ever Married Women (age 15-44 years),
Never Married Women (age 15-24 years), Village
Table 6: Number of Live/ Still Births (DLHS 1,2 & 3)
DLHS 1 DLHS 2 DLHS 3
1995 12,655 1999 15,162 2004 22,089
1996 35,556 2000 21,723 2005 36,037
1997 50,880 2001 46,043 2006 51,133
1998 49,539 2002 41,695 2007 63,519
1999 14,725 2003 29,440 2008 14,823
- - 2004 14,407 - -
Total 163355 Total 168,470 Total 187,601
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Table 7: Effect of the JSY on Institutional Deliveries-Average Treatment Effect
All India Rural Urban
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (3a) (3b)
LPS -0.336 -0.163 -0.313 -0.162 -0.289 -0.159
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
POST 0.064 0.043 0.093 0.058 0.041 0.013
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.006)*** (0.005)***
LPS * POST 0.011 0.006 0.016 -0.004 0.04 0.025
(0.006)* (0.004) (0.006)** (0.005) (0.011)*** (0.008)***
Constant 0.598 0.448 0.504 0.361 0.782 0.294
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)***
Observations 356071 352251 273033 270027 83038 82224
R-squared 0.11 0.3 0.1 0.24 0.09 0.3
Individual Controls N Y N Y N Y
Household Controls N Y N Y N Y
Village Controls N N N N N N
All columns estimated using OLS; Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at village level);
Columns 1 & 2 use the entire sample; Columns 3 & 4 use the rural sample. Columns 5 & 6
use the urban sample.
Dependent Variable:- whether the child was been delivered at a medical facility?
Individual controls:- whether the woman and her husband are literate, total pregnancies, age
of the woman at the time of the last birth, whether she went for antenatal care, and if she had any
problems during pregnancy.
Household controls:- caste, religion of the household, standard of living index, and whether the
household stays in the rural area.
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Table 8: Effect of the JSY on Institutional Deliveries- Annual Treatment Effect
All India Rural Urban
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (3a) (3b)
LPS -0.336 -0.164 -0.313 -0.164 -0.289 -0.159
(0.004)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)***
Y 2005 0.04 0.011 0.054 0.018 0.034 0.002
(0.007)*** (0.006)** (0.008)*** (0.007)** (0.010)*** (0.008)
Y 2006 0.061 0.04 0.087 0.054 0.041 0.013
(0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)**
Y 2007 0.077 0.057 0.112 0.074 0.048 0.021
(0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.006)***
Y 2008 0.061 0.052 0.097 0.073 0.026 0.007
(0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.010)*** (0.008)*** (0.011)** (0.010)
LPS * Y 2005 -0.036 -0.019 -0.025 -0.025 0.007 0.001
(0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.016) (0.013)
LPS * Y 2006 -0.033 -0.034 -0.027 -0.045 0.003 -0.007
(0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.007)*** (0.013) (0.010)
LPS * Y 2007 0.044 0.037 0.047 0.027 0.063 0.047
(0.007)*** (0.005)*** (0.008)*** (0.006)*** (0.013)*** (0.010)***
LPS * Y 2008 0.109 0.069 0.108 0.054 0.144 0.095
(0.010)*** (0.009)*** (0.012)*** (0.010)*** (0.020)*** (0.017)***
Constant 0.598 0.45 0.504 0.363 0.782 0.295
(0.003)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.013)***
Observations 356071 352251 273033 270027 83038 82224
R-squared 0.11 0.31 0.1 0.24 0.09 0.3
Individual Controls N Y N Y N Y
Household Controls N Y N Y N Y
Village Controls N N N N N N
All columns estimated using OLS; Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at village level);
Columns 1 & 2 use the entire sample; Columns 3 & 4 use the rural sample. Columns 5 & 6
use the urban sample.
Dependent Variable:- whether the child was been delivered at a medical facility?
Individual controls:- whether the woman and her husband are literate, total pregnancies, age
of the woman at the time of the last birth, whether she went for antenatal care, and if she had any
problems during pregnancy.
Household controls:- caste, religion of the household, standard of living index, and whether the
household stays in the rural area.
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Table 9: Pre-Treatment Trends in the Institutional Deliveries
All India Rural Urban
(1a) (2a) (1b) (2b) (3a) (3b)
LPS * Y 1996 0 -0.001 -0.01 -0.008 0.035 0.027
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018)** (0.016)*
LPS * Y 1997 -0.001 -0.003 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.007
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.017) (0.015)
LPS * Y 1998 -0.002 -0.001 -0.009 -0.006 0.01 0
(0.008) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008) (0.018) (0.015)
LPS * Y 1999 0.009 0.002 -0.027 -0.017 0.107 0.053
(0.012) (0.010) (0.014)** (0.012) (0.023)*** (0.019)***
LPS * Y 2000 -0.017 -0.018 -0.049 -0.038 0.076 0.036
(0.011) (0.009)* (0.013)*** (0.011)*** (0.021)*** (0.017)**
LPS * Y 2001 -0.007 -0.01 -0.035 -0.025 0.065 0.03
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011)*** (0.009)*** (0.019)*** (0.015)**
LPS * Y 2002 -0.006 -0.009 -0.032 -0.021 0.045 0.012
(0.010) (0.008) (0.011)*** (0.009)** (0.019)** (0.015)
LPS * Y 2003 -0.008 -0.011 -0.033 -0.02 0.028 0.008
(0.011) (0.009) (0.012)*** (0.010)** (0.020) (0.017)
LPS * Y 2004 -0.029 -0.018 -0.055 -0.034 -0.002 0.003
(0.013)** (0.010)* (0.014)*** (0.013)*** (0.023) (0.019)
Observations 331831 327720 256431 253220 75400 74500
R-squared 0.11 0.29 0.1 0.22 0.1 0.3
Individual Controls N Y N Y N Y
Household Controls N Y N Y N Y
Village Controls N N N N N N
All columns estimated using OLS; Robust standard errors in brackets (clustered at village level);
Columns 1 & 2 use the entire sample; Columns 3 & 4 use the rural sample. Columns 5 & 6
use the urban sample.
Dependent Variable:- whether the child was been delivered at a medical facility?
Individual controls:- whether the woman and her husband are literate, total pregnancies, age
of the woman at the time of the last birth, whether she went for antenatal care, and if she had any
problems during pregnancy.
Household controls:- caste, religion of the household, standard of living index, and whether the
household stays in the rural area.
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Table 10: Availability of Medical Facilities in the Village
ICDS Subcentre Primary Government Private AYUSH Mobile
Health Centre Dispensary Clinic Health Clinic
LPS -0.192 -0.13 -0.071 -0.029 -0.103 0.011 -0.03
(0.046)*** (0.046)** (0.044) (0.053) (0.057)* (0.044) (0.028)
POST 0.004 -0.019 -0.054 -0.072 -0.061 0.008 0.007
(0.010) (0.028) (0.015)*** (0.035)* (0.028)** (0.026) (0.014)
LPS * POST 0.145 0.015 0.008 0.038 -0.035 -0.05 -0.049
(0.042)*** (0.043) (0.048) (0.055) (0.062) (0.057) (0.024)*
Constant 0.953 0.49 0.219 0.141 0.351 0.131 0.127
(0.011)*** (0.032)*** (0.040)*** (0.043)*** (0.043)*** (0.041)*** (0.022)***
Observations 33103 32974 33104 33103 33077 33050 33101
R-squared 0.06 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 0 0.01
Table 11: Access to the Medical Facilities in the Village
ICDS Subcentre Primary Community District Private
Health Centre Hospital Hospital Hopsital
LPS -0.105 -0.065 -0.046 -0.018 -0.029 -0.037
(0.034)*** (0.032)* (0.037) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
POST 0.003 0.017 0.012 0.025 -0.025 0.023
(0.002) (0.016) (0.030) (0.033) (0.042) (0.025)
LPS * POST 0.089 0.007 -0.009 -0.032 0.014 -0.024
(0.034)** (0.034) (0.045) (0.054) (0.061) (0.038)
Constant 0.989 0.903 0.866 0.807 0.823 0.84
(0.002)*** (0.020)*** (0.026)*** (0.028)*** (0.032)*** (0.033)***
Observations 33102 32933 32784 32693 32736 32729
R-squared 0.05 0.01 0 0 0 0
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